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Regarding Simón y otros:
Accountability in Argentina
and
International Human Rights as Domestic Positive Law
Gaspar Forteza*
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, a man, a woman, and their infant daughter
were abducted by paramilitary forces from their home in Argentina.
The man and woman were taken for interrogation to an infamous
clandestine military installation known as “El Olympo,” where they
were separated from their daughter. More than twenty years later, the
man’s mother learned that her now adult granddaughter was living
under an assumed identity as the daughter of a military official. The
fate of the man and woman is still unknown and they are presumed
murdered—as such, they are “disappeared.” Occurrences such as this
were unfortunately not uncommon during the previous military dictatorship of Argentina.
Conservative estimates place the number of forced disappearances during the military regime that controlled the Argentinean gov1
ernment during 1976-1983 between 10,000 and 15,000 persons. Shortly after the end of military rule in 1983, the Argentinean National
Congress passed legislation that effectively amnestied many persons
who allegedly committed human rights violations such as torture, extra-judicial killing, and forced disappearance. This legislation took the
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form of two laws known as the Law of Due Obedience and the Full
2
Stop Law.
Argentina has seen few legal issues as contentiously debated as
these two laws of amnesty during the last two decades. Nonetheless,
these contentions are now definitively resolved. In 2001, Judge Gabriel Cavallo, sitting at the Buenos Aires Federal Court, declared the
amnesty legislation unconstitutional—a declaration that allows even
those that have previously benefited from the laws to be prosecuted.
In 2005, the Federal Supreme Court affirmed this position by a supermajority decision, where eight of the nine justices filed separate opinions—seven passionately concurring with the lower court, and one
dissenting.
3
This comment will examine that decision, entitled Simón y otros,
and demonstrate that this dramatic shift towards accountability is the
product not only of the internalization of jus cogens into Argentinean
positive law, but also of a refocused military and political climate,
which previously impeded the full enforcement of international human rights in Argentina.
In order to accomplish this task, the socio-historical context of
military rule between 1976 and 1983 must be illustrated. This will be
addressed in Part I of this comment. Part II will discuss the two laws
that granted partial amnesty to military officials in their respective
contexts. In Part III, the main arguments set forth in Simón y otros
will be outlined, allowing for the exploration of the central point of
this comment: that Argentina has shifted its human rights model from
partial amnesty to accountability via the integration of international
legal principles into an internal positive directive superior to national
legislation.
PART I—1976-1983
A. Prelude To War
The period from 1976 – 1983 was undoubtedly one of the more
violent and unstable times of modern Argentinean history. During
this period, a military coup d’etat overthrew all governmental institutions and a junta assumed political authority, an act later justified by

2
Respectively, Law No. 23521, June 6, 1987, [XLIV-A] A.L.J.A. 260, [Obediencia Debida]
[hereinafter Law of Due Obedience]; Law No. 23492, Dec. 24, 1986, [XLIV-A] A.D.L.A. 1100,
[Ley de Punto Final] [hereinafter Full Stop Law].
3
Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 06/14/2005 “Simón, Julio H. y otros s/privación ilegítima de la libertad,” Semanarios de Jurisprudencia Argentina [SJA], (11/02/2005) (Arg.). [hereinafter Simón y otros].
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the National Congress. This, however, was not the first time Argentina’s government had been dissolved and the democratic process interrupted.
Coups had been eroding Argentina’s governmental institutions
5
for the better part of the Twentieth Century. Indeed, the repeated
interruptions of democratic institutions throughout that century had
fostered instability, corruption, and widespread disillusion in the go6
verning branches. Until the late 1990s, the last president to have
completed his presidency in a constitutional fashion was Juan Domin7
go Perón, in 1952.
Leftist political movements, encouraged by the success of the Cu8
ban revolution, spread across Latin America. Political corruption and
a devastated economy encouraged fanatical Argentinean socialist
movements, some of which eventually engaged in guerrilla warfare
9
throughout the 1970s. Rallying behind the flag of Marxist-Leninist
ideals, groups such as the Montoneros and the Ejercito Revolucionario
del Pueblo (ERP) sought to overthrow the government led by Isabel

4
“Acta para el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional,” codified by Law No. 21256, Mar.
26, 1976, reprinted in ALBERTO DEARRIBA, EL GOLPE —24 DE MARZO DE 1976 286 (Editorial
Sudamerica S.A. 2001).
5
Indeed, military regimes overthrew the legitimate democratic governments in 1930, 1943,
1955, and 1975. See LUIS ALBERTO ROMERO, A HISTORY OF ARGENTINA IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (Pennsylvania State University Press 2002) (1994).
6
DONALD C. HODGES, ARGENTINA, 1943-1987: THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND
RESISTANCE 178 (rev. ed. 1988).
7
See MÓNICA DELEIS, ET AL., EL LIBRO DE LOS PRESIDENTES ARGENTINOS DEL SIGLO
XX (2000). Indeed, Juan D. Perón’s second term was interrupted by a coup d’etat in 1955, and
he was later forced to retreat into exile in Paraguay; President Arturo Frondizi, in office in 19581962, was forced to resign by the military due to political tensions; José María Guido, in office in
1962-1963, was elected by the Senate as the interim chief executive; Arturo H. Illia, in office in
1963-1966, assumed his post after elections were reconvened. He was subsequently deposed by
another military coup; Juan Carlos Onganía, in office in 1966-1970, was a president under military rule; Roberto Levingston, in office in 1970-1971, was a president under military rule; Alejandro Lanusse, in office in 1971-1973, was a president under military rule; Héctor J. Cámpora
held the office for some months in 1973, until he resigned to allow Juan D. Perón to reassume the
position; Raúl A. Lastiri in office in 1973 as provisional president for the month of October; Juan
Domingo Perón in office in 1973-1974, after his return from exile and reconvening of elections.
He died while in office. María Estela Martínez de Perón, Juan D. Peron’s vice-president and
wife, was in office in 1974-1976. She maintained the presidency until 1976, when she was overthrown by the coup central to this Comment. It could be argued that President Raúl Alfonsín, in
office in 1983-1989, was the first president in the latter half of the 20th century to have finished his
term of office as the constitution contemplated, but he resigned before the end of his term due to
economic and political turmoil. In 1999, President Menem was the first president in nearly fifty
years to complete his term in office in a constitutional fashion, although he accomplished this
only after having the constitution amended specifically to allow for his re-election.
8
DEBORAH L. NORDEN, MILITARY REBELLION IN ARGENTINA 56-57 (University of
Nebraska Press 1996).
9
Id. at 57-58.
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Perón and institute a more egalitarian and populist system. The attempted revolution was marked by more than protests—terrorist
bombings and kidnappings of government officials occurred with rela11
tive frequency in Buenos Aires during 1975. The government of Isabel Perón, unable to deal with the escalation of violence, issued an
order to the military on February 2, 1975, known as “Operation Independence,” to enter into the province of Tucumán and “eradicate
12
and/or annihilate the actions of subversive elements.” The political
climate was ripe for change. With overwhelming public support, military commanders deposed and arrested Isabel Perón and a junta took
control of the democratic government with little difficulty in March of
13
1976.
B. A Dirty War
th
On the 24 of March, 1976, the Armed Forces assumed political
control of the Republic and immediately enacted the Statute for the
Process of National Reorganization (Process Statute), which detailed
14
the objectives and measures of the junta. The Process Statute validated the military’s assumption of the national political power, the
expiration of all executive decrees, the dissolution of the national and
provincial legislatures, as well as the dissolution of all political parties
and labor unions, and the removal of all Judges of the Federal Su15
preme Court, Attorney General, and provincial Judges.
After removing officials from their positions and leaving only the
empty shells of the remaining governmental institutions, the junta
staffed the legislative, executive, and judicial branches with their appointees, but under a new rule of law. The National Constitution was
16
reduced to the rank of a supplementary document.

10

Id.
See id. at 58-59. Norden notes that until 1974, “deaths attributed to ‘subversion,’ or
guerrilla actions, were actually higher than the number of deaths attributed to the military (‘the
disappeared’).” Id.
12 Id.
13 ROMERO, supra note 5, at 214.
14 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 12/09/85, “Causa originariamente instruida por el
Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas en cumplimiento del decreto 158/83 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional,” Fallos (1986-309-1692) (Arg.).
15 Estatuto para el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, 03/26/1976, available at
http://www.nuncamas.org/document/militar/estatpro.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2006) (hereinafter
Process Statute); see also Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal [Juzg. Nac.
Crim. Corr. Fed.], 06/03/2001, “Simón, Julio y otro,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-III240)(Arg.) [hereinafter Simón y otros, Lower Court decision].
16 Estatuto para el Proceso, id.
11
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Many people welcomed the new regime. Indeed, the Process
Statute promised that which most Argentineans sought—a just and
18
responsible government. The junta took control with the publicized
purpose of ‘restoring the Republic to its greatness,’ and ‘restoring the
essential values that are required for the efficient and effective func19
tion of government, and fundamental to national pride.’ In theory, by
subsuming the national constitution and all statutes, the junta ironically sought to restore the republic to its constitutional roots, a ‘republi20
can, federal, and representative democracy.’ Although the aims of
the junta always included re-establishing national security, this soon
became the principal objective. During the first sixteen days of the
junta’s control of the country, 152 persons died in clashes with the mil21
itary efforts to carry out this edict.
The military subordinate National Congress passed Ley 21.338, a
22
legislative act that reformed the Argentinean Criminal Code. Under
this law, the death penalty, previously not contemplated by the Crimi23
nal Code, was reinstated, requiring executions to be carried out within 48 hours from the moment of judgment, and no more than 10 days
24
in special circumstances. Increased penalties for almost all crimes
25
were set. A veil of legal sanction thus attempted to justify dramatic
grants of political power to the military, which no longer had any ef26
fective political check.
On March 24th, 1976, General Videla, the head of junta, announced via radio and every national television station that, “as of this
moment, severe exercise of authority is necessary to eradicate the vices that affect the country. To that end, subversion shall continue to be
ceaselessly combated, and corruption, venality, and transgressions
17

ROMERO, supra note 5, at 214.
Id. at 215.
19 Preamble to the Process Statute (author’s translation).
20 Simón y otros, Lower Court decision, supra note 15 (author’s translation).
21 MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA AND THE LEGACIES
OF TORTURE 25 (Oxford University Press 1998).
22 Law No. 21.338, June, 25, 1976, Lexis Nº LNACLY21338 (LexisNexis Argentina).
23 Id. art. 1.
24 Id. bis.
25 See id. For example, the Criminal Code, Article 145 previously punished those that
recruited Argentineans for foreign conflicts for a period of 2 to 6 years. Law No. 11179, Sept. 30,
1921, Lexis N° LNACLO11179_1984 (LexisNexis Argentina). The military revised the Criminal
sanctions provision of Article 145 via Law No. 21.338, which increased the punishment for these
crimes from 3 to 15 years, and included the prohibition against recruitment for “subversive” acts.
Law No. 21.338; Others included the increment of punishment for opening another’s mail (Art.
155), and the increment of the minimum punishment for any sort of theft (Art. 164). Id.
26 STELLA MARIS AGEITOS, LA HISTORIA DE LA IMPUNIDAD —ARGENTINA (1976 / 1989):
DESDE LAS ACTAS DEL PROCESO A LOS INDULTOS DE MENEM, http://www.cuestiones1.net/revista/n10/ago02-arg-ageitos.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
18
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against the law will not be tolerated under any circumstances. Nor
will any opposition to the reparation efforts of the Process Statute be
27
tolerated.”
28
Thus commenced the “Guerra Sucia,” or Dirty War, so named
for the characterization of the clash between the military and the elements they meant to eradicate. A systematic and controlled method
of combating subversion was created, where clandestine military
forces identified suspected individuals, kidnapped them, and subjected
29
them to interrogations under various creative methods of torture. If
not returned to their homes, the people who were kidnapped were
usually “disappeared,” i.e., killed and later disposed of, never to be
30
found. Families that inquired about their missing kin were kept ignorant of their condition and location. This well-settled strategy of
maintaining a state of permanent terror and uncertainty was seen as
31
an effective counter-subversive measure.
Many persons “disappeared” also left behind children, some of
32
whom were adopted by military families and their identities altered.
Because it is believed many children of interrogated persons were
raised by military families, there still remain numerous signposts in
Buenos Aires saying, “If you have any doubt about your identity call
33
the Abuelas.” A government report entitled “Nunca Más,” includes
over 50,000 pages detailing the disappearance, torture, and murder of
8,960 missing persons, and concludes that the majority of those were
not associated in any substantial manner with “elements of subver-

Id.; Statement of General Videla, March 24th, 1976.; Alicia Oliveira, María José Guembe,
La Verdad, Derecho de la Sociedad, http://www.derechopenal.com.ar/archivos.php?op=20&id=12
(Last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
28 The term is believed to be coined by the Argentinean press in order to describe the
unique manner of conflict between the military and the subversive forces—a war with no rules.
Haley Cutler, Digging Up the Dirt: Who Really Won Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’?, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~uwp/fyw/euonymous/Cutler.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
29 ROMERO, supra note 5, at 217 (noting that, “In principle, torture served to extract information and reveal the names, places of residence, and planned operations of the guerrilla organizations, but more generally it served to break the resistance of the abducted persons, to annul
their defenses, to destroy their dignity and personality.”).
30 Id.; FEITLOWITZ, supra note 21, at 51 (recounting testimony of interrogated persons,
including pregnant women and children).
31 ROMERO, supra note 5, at 216-17; FEITLOWITZ, supra note 21, at 51 (recounting testimony of a tortured sixteen-year old pregnant girl, being told no one would come look for her or find
her).
32 ROMERO, supra note 5, at 218. Indeed, this is also evidenced by the facts of the case
examined in this Comment.
33 Lisa Avery, A Return to Life: The Right to Identity and the Right to Identify Argentina’s
‘Living Disappeared,’ 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 235, 235 (2004).
27
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34

sion.” The report revealed that there were over 340 clandestine military installations throughout the country where interrogations took
35
place.
Also part of the military restoration of Argentinean dignity involved the reintegration of the Malvinas Islands (Falkland Islands)
36
into the Argentinean geographical sovereign. A failed attempt to
recapture the islands diplomatically led to war with Britain in 1982,
37
which had claimed that territory. After a six-week battle, the Argentinean military returned decimated to find a nation struggling to sur38
vive in a stagnant economy and dissention within military ranks. Military officials were charged with mismanagement of the war, and internal military conflicts led the junta to voluntarily call for elections in
39
1983.
In April of that year, the military released its “Documento Final,”
declaring its victory over subversion, and stating that all acts of military officers in the Guerra Sucia were strictly pursuant to valid mili40
tary orders. Only a few months prior to the commencement of elections, the junta issued its last official order through the national legislature, entitled the National Pacification Law, as a last attempt to amnesty all criminal acts committed by the military during the period of
41
1973 to 1982.
Presidential candidate Raúl Alfonsín publicly declared he had no
intent to recognize even a modicum of legality in the National Pacification Law and would regard it only as a poorly veiled attempt at self42
exoneration. The President responded to the military’s Final Report
declaration:

34 NUNCA MÁS: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE
DISAPPEARED (1984), http://www.nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm (last
visited Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter NUNCA MÁS REPORT].
35 Id.
36 ROMERO, supra note 5, at 240-47.
37 Id.
38 Timeline: Argentina, A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEWS, Jan, 13, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1196005.stm (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
39 See HODGES, supra note 6, at 276-81; ROMERO, supra note 5, at 247.
40 “Documento final de la Junta Militar sobre la Guerra contra la subversión y el terrorismo.” available at http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/doc/secretos/final02.htm (last visited March
15, 2006). The Document was aired over radio and read on national television on April 23rd,
1983. Military officials Cristino Nicolaides, Rubén Franco, and Augusto Hughes placed their
signatures on the document, and consequently, this became the primary piece of evidence leading to their conviction for, inter alia, the kidnapping of children.
41 Law No. 22924, Sept. 27, 1983, Lexis Nº LNACLY22924 (LexisNexis Argentina).
42 RAÚL ALFONSÍN, MEMORIA POLÍTICA —TRANSICIÓN \ Y DERECHOS HUMANOS 34
(Fondo de Cultura Económica Argentina S.A. 2004).
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Those illegal actions committed by the military during the
repression must be adjudicated by our judicial system and
not just by history…The Judiciary shall dictate, rather than
interested parties, what actions may be considered to have
been carried out pursuant to valid military orders. It is
against the most fundamental principles of law to hold that
crimes against the life or physical wellbeing of citizens that
posed no resistance were actions reasonably within the
43
scope of military service.
44

The Supreme Court would echo his reasoning in 1986. Along
with promises of justice and truth, Alfonsín’s commitment to pursuing
military officials won him a great deal of public support, culminating
45
in his election victory.
PART II—1983-2005
A. Focus on Human Rights
Alfonsín kept his word. After his inauguration, he quickly instituted a plan of military accountability for crimes against the Argenti46
nean people. Only five days after assuming his office, he issued an
executive decree which created the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP), a truth commission composed of
hand-picked officials, whose main purpose was investigating com47
plaints involving disappeared persons and children. This commission
48
issued the aforementioned final report, Nunca Más. Also as part of
his first acts, President Alfonsín signed the United Nations’ Interna49
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was
quickly followed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social
50
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

43 “Respuesta
del candidato Alfonsín al ‘Documento Final,’” available at
http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/doc/secretos/candi.html (last visited March 15, 2006).
44 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], “Causa incoada por Decreto 158/83 del Poder
Ejecutivo Nacional,” Fallos (1986-309-5) (Arg.).
45 See ALFONSÍN, supra note 42, at 34.
46 Id. at 33-52.
47 Id.;
Executive
Decree
PEN
Nº
187/1983,
available
at
http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/co-nadep/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
48 NUNCA MÁS REPORT, supra note 34.
49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, Doc. A/6316/49 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
50 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
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(Torture Convention). More importantly, and more central to our
discussion, Argentina recognized the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights and signed the American Conven52
tion on Human Rights.
President Alfonsín also recognized that it was in the nation’s best
interests to pursue superior military officers swiftly and efficiently, lest
he upset the fragile peace between the military and the civilian gov53
ernment. He sought to limit prosecutions to about 100 officers, and
trusted that the military tribunals to carry out the sentences expedi54
tiously.
Several military officials were tried and convicted, but President
55
Alfonsín still received international criticism for “leniency.” Legislation up to 1985 required the crimes to be tried first in military tribun56
als, and of those, a clause of “due obedience” in the Military Code of
Justice exculpated officers if they were merely following the orders of
57
a superior. Given that the Military Code of Justice was not enforceable in non-military tribunals, officers were understandably disquieted
58
by the notion of civilian courts trying military officials.
Furthermore, facing staunch criticism for leaving this matter solely in the hands of military courts, Alfonsín opted for a compromise.
He introduced a law into Congress that would allow appeals to be
59
made as of right to civilian courts. The Congress expanded upon his
proposal and enacted a law that allowed the Buenos Aires Court of
Appeal to assume the cases being tried in military tribunals if these
60
were found to delay unnecessarily. This law proved crucial because
51 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10,
1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
52 American Convention on Human Rights, Organization of American States, OFFICIAL
RECORDS, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 2 (1970). The Convention can also be
found reprinted by the American Society of International Law, 9 ILM 673 (1970) [hereinafter
American Convention].
53 COLIN M. LEWIS AND NISSA TORRENTS (eds.), ARGENTINA IN THE CRISIS YEARS, 1983–
1990: FROM ALFONSÍN TO MENEM 54-55 (Institute of Latin American Studies 1993).
54 Id.
55 Alfonsín, supra note 42, at 37-39.
56 Law No. Ley 23049, March 13, 1984, Lexis Nº LNACLY23049 (LexisNexis Argentina).
This law modified Article 108 of the Military Code of Justice (established by Law No. 14029),
granting military tribunals jurisdiction to hear controversies arising out of the Dirty War. Id.
57 Military Code of Justice, Article 514. Published by the Argentinean Military Virtual
Library, available at http://www.biblioteca.ejercito.mil.ar/Doctrina/Doctrina/pe0003.htm (last
visited Jan. 26, 2006); Law No. 14029, July 16, 1951, Lexis Nº LNACLY14029 (LexisNexis Argentina).
58 ALFONSÍN, supra note 42, at 37-38.
59 Executive Decree 158/83, reprinted in M. A. SANCINETTI, DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LA
ARGENTINA POST-DICTATORIAL 34-6 (Buenos Aires 1988).
60 Law 23049, supra note 56; LEWIS & TORRENTS, supra note 53, at 55.
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the dockets of military tribunals were replete with prosecutions over
the mismanagement of the Malvinas war and were not able to prose61
cute for human crimes violations in a speedy manner.
After a year of failing to deliver a single verdict on human rights
violations, the military tribunals moved the cases to the civilian courts,
where the nine members of the junta were prosecuted for all their
62
counter subversive actions. Judges were drawn from diverse backgrounds to relieve any fears of personal allegiance to Alfonsín, and
federal prosecutor Dr. Julio Cesar Strassera charged the officers with
over 700 separate counts of torture, rape, murder, unjust imprison63
ment, and theft of personal property. Hundreds of counts of murder
were brought, a charge often made impossible to prove when the vic64
tim had “disappeared.” General Jorge Videla was incarcerated along
65
with four other senior officers. Many courts suspended their dockets
66
and focused mainly on charges alleging human rights violations.
By 1987, around 450 military officials were being prosecuted for
67
crimes against the Argentinean people. This was the first time in the
country’s history that military officials were tried by Federal courts for
68
their acts while in service. Indeed, although many Latin American
nations had suffered through similar regimes, such prosecutions were
69
an unprecedented event in the history of the continent. This consi70
derably unsettled the military.
Further, the military grew increasingly restless by the highly pub71
licized announcements and reports of the CONADEP. Complaints
against over 2,000 members of the military were brought by victims,
whom civilian courts could not ignore, and consequently, Alfonsín’s
plan for the swift prosecution of the most senior 100 members of the
72
military was frustrated. The very public prosecution of the military
73
leaders had a strong impact on the national Armed Forces. Their
74
disquiet grew, and rumors of another coup spread through the nation.
61

LEWIS & TORRENTS, supra note 53, at 55.
NORDEN, supra note 8, at 102.
63 Simón y otros, Lower Court decision, supra note 15.
64 NORDEN, supra note 8, at 102.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 103.
67 Id.
68 ALFONSÍN, supra note 42, at 38.
69 LEWIS & TORRENTS, supra note 53, at 56.
70 See id.
71 Andrew S. Brown, Adios Amnesty: Prosecutorial Discretion and Military Trials in Argentina, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 203, 211 (2002).
72 LEWIS & TORRENTS, supra note 53, at 56.
73 NORDEN, supra note 8, at 129.
74 Id.
62
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Several small military uprisings occurred, arguably sparked by Major
Ernesto Barreiro’s refusal to appear in court on a summons, and culminating in a confrontation between several hundred officers and pro75
testing civilians at the Plaza de Mayo, in Buenos Aires. Small upris76
ings quickly coalesced into an identifiable military resistance. Junior
military officers took control of several military command posts and
demonstrated to the President that he would be unable to quell the
77
uprising without military support.
Some commentators have argued that were it not for a complete
lack of prosecutorial discretion, which obligates the Argentinean
prosecutor to try every case that comes before him in accordance with
the Criminal Code, the government might have avoided the numerous
military uprisings that threatened to overthrow the democratic gov78
ernment. Nonetheless, as one writer put it, “Alfonsín did not have
complete control over the trials he had initiated. Once the ball started
79
rolling, stopping it became almost impossible.”
80
In an effort to appease the threatened military, President Alfonsín proposed an interpretive norm of Article 511 of the Military
81
Code of Justice and of Article 36, clause 6 of the Criminal Code. This
norm of statutory interpretation would establish a rebuttable presumption that, despite the illegality of the military orders, the subordinate officers could not be faulted for following them because of
82
conditions of pressure, propaganda, and terror. The Senate accepted
this proposal, but modified it to include an exception for ‘serious and
83
aberrant’ crimes. Without any meaningful definition of what was
“serious and aberrant,” the modified proposal created a loophole
wide enough to nullify any effect that might have appeased the mili84
tary.
Practically every member of the military government would later
85
be subpoenaed. These events, in the words of President Alfonsín,
‘increased the climate of grave tension in the divisions of the Armed
86
Forces . . . . Each one of its men felt threatened.’ The chief of the ar-

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 128-29.
Id.
See id. at 128-38.
See Brown, supra note 71, at 217.
NORDEN, supra note 8, at 128.
ALFONSÍN, supra note 42, at 49.
Military Code of Justice, Article 511, supra note 57.
ALFONSÍN, supra note 42, at 49.
Id. (author’s translation).
See id.
Brown, supra note 71, at 212.
ALFONSÍN, supra note 42, at 49 (author’s translation).
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my declared that if the judicial summons of military generals did not
87
cease, the military would respond with violence. The President would
have to concede many of his original goals in order to prevent the
very real and materialized coup looming on the horizon from engulfing the republic once more.
B. Alfonsín—Prosecution and Amnesty
In late 1986, President Alfonsín introduced the Ley de Caducidad
de la Acción Penal, (otherwise known as the Ley de Punto Final, or
88
Full Stop Law), which was quickly passed by the national legislature.
The law created a statute of limitations for prosecutions of crimes
89
committed by the military regime. Charges for individual crimes
would have to be brought within sixty days of the promulgation of the
90
law or be completely barred.
Although the purpose was to decrease the number of trials and
thereby quiet the military-civilian tensions, the law instead had a
91
“boomerang” effect. The Law was passed at a strategic time, in late
December, knowing that the month of January was reserved as a
92
scheduled vacation for the courts. Nonetheless, faced with the findings of CONADEP, many courts cancelled their vacations and instead
93
subpoenaed hundreds of officials.
After the tolling of the statute, over four hundred officials were in
94
criminal proceedings, many having been already incarcerated. For
lower-ranked officers who had been formally charged before the expiration of the sixty-day statute of limitations, this legislation was far
95
96
from adequate. Another military uprising ensued in 1987. It appeared the president would require stronger measures to prevent
97
another coup.
98
Specially tailored to assuage those at the heart of the rebellion,
the Law of Due Obedience was introduced by the president to the
99
national legislature, which passed it with little resistance. This statute
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Brown, supra note 71, at 212.
Full Stop Law, supra note 2.
Id. at art. 1.
Id.
ALFONSÍN, supra note 42, at 50.
NORDEN, supra note 8, at 103.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 103-04.
See id. at 104.
Id.
Law of Due Obedience, supra note 2.
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integrated the due obedience clause found in Article 513 of the Mili100
101
tary Code of Justice into federal statutory law. The due obedience
clause of the Military Code of Justice exculpated all actions of subordinate officers if their conduct was within the scope of a superior’s
102
military order, Alfonsín’s Law of Due Obedience tailored the exculpation much more narrowly. The statute read: ‘It is presumed, and
not admitting proof to the contrary, that those who at the time of the
commission of the acts, were subordinates, sub-officials, and personnel
staff of the Armed Forces, in divisions of security, police, and prisons,
are not punishable for [alleged crimes during military rule] by virtue
of having been required to follow orders. The same presumption shall
be held for superior officers. . . . In those cases, it shall be considered as
a matter of law that these officers acted under unquestionable orders,
and were incapable of opposing, resisting, or investigating the or103
ders.’
This statute established an irrebuttable presumption of fact—that
officers of a certain determined rank were presumed to have been
104
following orders which they were powerless to disobey. No evidence
105
or proof otherwise could be admitted to rebut this presumption.
Like the Full Stop Law, the Due Obedience statute conceived of
extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape, but explicitly excluded the exculpation of the theft of minors, personal and real property, and
106
changing minors’ legal identity.
This last statute was crippling to the already weakened prosecu107
tion effort. The number of accused still in process dropped to about
100

Law No. 14029, Military Code of Justice, Article 513, supra note 57.
NORDEN, supra note 8, at 104.
102 Law No. 14029, Military Code of Justice, Article 514, supra note 57. The text of the
Article reads: “When a crime is committed while in the performance of an order of a superior
officer, only the superior officer shall be responsible, unless the subordinate officer exceeded the
scope of the order given.” Id. (author’s translation).
103 Law of Due Obedience, supra note 2, at art. 1 (author’s translation).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 The pertinent language for both Statutes are as follows: “The present law does not
extinguish criminal actions in the cases of the alteration of the civil status, kidnapping, or interference with the custody of any minor.” Full Stop Law, Article 5, supra note 2. (author’s translation); “The presumption established in the previous article shall not be applicable to crimes
involving the rape, kidnapping, or interference with the custody of any minor.” Law of Due
Obedience, Article 2, supra note 2 (author’s translation). See also Laura Oren, Righting Child
Custody Wrongs: The Children of the “Disappeared” in Argentina 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123
(2001). Ms. Oren details the unique situation of children adopted by military families, often
following the killing of their parents, and how the laws of amnesty were not willing to go as far as
ignoring those children still “disappeared,” but very much living. The facts of Simón y otros
yields a prime example of this situation, where the case was initiated against a military family for
the recovery of Claudia Victoria Poblete.
107 See NORDEN, supra note 8, at 104.
101
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300, and many officers previously facing prison were exonerated.
The public outrage soon became marred by the economic ruin of the
110
Argentinean state. Some commentators have argued that the subordination of economic concerns was necessary in order to rebuild
111
struggling democratic institutions.
Further aggravating military disquiet, the Alfonsín administration’s mismanagement of the national purse resulted in very poor na112
tional economic health and in lower military wages. Subsequent attacks by insurgents against military barracks escalated tensions once
113
more. Alfonsín had no choice but to allow the military to have a
strong hand in the national policymaking, and granted several large
114
defense funding plans.
C. Menem—Amnesty and Confession
President Alfonsín resigned from his office five months before
115
the end of his term. In the throes of escalating military-civilian ten116
sions and uncontrollable inflation rates, presidential candidate Car117
los Menem gave an ultimatum, “Me or Chaos.” Menem promised
dramatic economic change by employing free-market plans and enlist118
ing the assistance of international corporate interests. In order to
carry out his economic plans, Menem needed to pacify the country
119
and obtain the aid of the military. Menem’s approach to restoring
the peace involved pardoning all officials already incarcerated for
crimes committed during the dictatorship along with all the rebels also
120
imprisoned, which he did, shortly after taking office in July of 1989.
By 1990, only ten convictions for human rights violations were obtained, and these were ultimately overturned and the officials re-

108

Id.
See id.
110 ROMERO, supra note 5, at 267.
111 Id. at 268.
112 Horacio Verbitsky, El CELS Pide la Nulidad de la Ley de Obediencia Debida—La Hora
del Juicio, Página 12 (Buenos Aires), http://www.pagina12.com.ar/2001/01-02/01-02-11/pag11.htm
(Feb. 11, 2001) (Last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
113 ALFONSÍN, supra note 42, at 81-91.
114 Id.
115 DELEIS, ET AL., supra note 7, at 444.
116 Indeed, inflation rates in 1989 reached more than 4,000%. Brown, supra note 71, at 213.
117 Avery, supra note 33, at 246
118 ROMERO, supra note 5, at 285-87.
119 See Brown, supra note 71, at 214.
120 NORDEN, supra note 8, at 140.
109
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121

Public outrage was partly restrained by Menem’s having
leased.
122
been under military captivity for five years.
123
By the 1990s, all officials tried in the mid-1980s were free.
However, as a response to a decision by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concerning a number of Argentinean civilians
that were unable to obtain judgment in national courts, Menem issued
124
a number of executive decrees. These provided for very limited
monetary recovery of damages suffered by civilian victims of crimes
125
against them during the regime. The compensation system was specially tailored to avoid military tension: the funds awarded would be
paid by the Judge of the Interior, a non-military official, and only
those that had initiated claims prior to 1985 could obtain some com126
pensation. This solution did not reach the great majority of clai127
mants.
Shielded by the amnesty legislation and frustrated by the Senate
blocking many military promotions, many officials publicly confessed
128
of crimes committed during the military regime. When the Senate
did not authorize the promotion of Navy Captain Antonio Pernías, an
intelligence officer serving under the Navy Mechanical School
(ESMA) in Buenos Aires, he admitted to the Navy’s involvement in
the kidnapping and subsequent killing of three French nuns—a major
controversy for which he had been imprisoned and later exonerated
129
by the Due Obedience law. More confessions followed, including
one widely publicized in an interview between Captain Adolfo Scilingo and journalist Horacio Verbitsky, where the Captain recounted
how he had participated in a military system of drugging interrogated
persons, stripping them of clothing, and throwing them alive from
130
planes over the Atlantic Ocean.
121 SEBASTIAN
BRETT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RELUCTANT PARTNER: THE
ARGENTINEAN GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO BACK TRIALS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS,
(2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/argentina/ (follow hyperlink “I. Summary
and Recommendations”) (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
122 DELEIS, ET AL., supra note 7, at 452 (recounting Menem’s imprisonment from the day of
the military coup d’etat until February 1981).
123 BRETT, supra note 121.
124 Report No. 1/93, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser./L/V/II.83, doc. 14corr.1(1993),
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/92eng/Argentina10.288.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Daniel W. Schwartz, Rectifying Twenty-Five Years of Material Breach: Argentina and the
Legacy of the ‘Dirty War’ in International Law, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 317, 337-40 (2004).
128 See BRETT, supra note 121.
129 Id.
130 HORACIO VERBITSKY, EL VUELO —UNA FORMA CRISTIANA DE MUERTE —
CONFESIONES DE UN OFICIAL DE LA ARMADA (Editorial Sudamericana 2004). This confession
led to the extradition of Adolfo Scilingo to Spain for trial of crimes against humanity concerning
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On April 25 , 1995, newly appointed General Martín Balza declared on a television broadcast that the Armed Forces were indeed
responsible for a gross violation of human rights crimes and those actions were a terrible miscalculation by the junta in attempting to era131
dicate subversion. He added that the commission of such acts could
132
never be justified by the following of orders. An international spotlight shined on Argentina's past, prompting criticism and reviving international and domestic pressures to investigate allegations of human
133
rights crimes. A constitutional reform in 1994 marked the dissipa134
tion of the military force majeure. Over a decade later, the elevation
of international human rights treaties to constitutional standing demonstrated that the desire for accountability and investigation into the
135
events of 1976-1983 did not decrease with the passage of time.
This renewed fervor would allow for the reconsideration of Argentina’s policy for Dirty War amnesty. In 1998, the National Congress derogated the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws, making them
136
useless in suits thereafter initiated. Because such derogation only
allowed for the suit of officers that had not already benefited from the
laws, it could not reach the overwhelming majority of those believed
137
to be culpable. The National Congress passed a law declaring null
138
and void the two amnesty laws. Until Simón y otros, it was unknown
whether Congress had the power to nullify its own laws and make the
his involvement in those “Flights of Death”;BRETT, supra note 121; Argentinean 'Dirty War'
Suspect Convicted, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A681-2005Apr19_2.html
(last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
131 See BRETT, supra note 121.
132 See id.
133 The confessions by military officials marked a renewal of debate in the public forum
concerning the truth of the allegations of human rights violations. The Center for Legal and
Social Studies, the party that initiated the action in Simón y otros, stated that “It was evident
from the beginning that Scilingo’s words had reached many ears, and little by little the surprising
conversations that could be heard in bars and shops filtered through to the various institutions
which until then had remained exclusively silent.” Human Rights Watch Report, Argentina:
Reluctant Partner (2001), avaliable at http://www.nuncamas.org/investig/hrw_121201_01.htm
(last visited March 1, 2006).
134 Janet Kovin Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or
Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 281, 309-11 (1999).
135 CONST. ARG. art. 75, cl. 22 (1994).
136 Law 24.952, April 15, 1998, LexisNexis Argentina, Lexis Nº 04683; Simón y otros, supra
note 3, at Considerando No. 2 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
137 See Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 15 of Judge Maqueda’s vote. Professor Luis Jiménez de Asúa stated on the floor of Congressional debates that “Crimes against
humanity are as old as humanity itself. The legal concept is, however, a new one, given that these
require a status of civilization capable of recognizing human rights laws, with respect to the
individual and his activities…
it is important that this Congress does not deny this…we have an
unrenounceable ethical obligation: remove the obstacles that prohibit Argentina from persecuting those that committed crimes against humanity.” Id. (author’s translation).
138 Law No. 25779, Sept. 3, 2003, Lexis Nº LNACLY25779 (LexisNexis Argentina).
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139

invalidation apply retroactively. Consonant with a revived national
consensus for accountability and repeated Congressional action hostile to the amnesty laws, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
June 14th, 2005.
D. Treaties Under The Argentinean Constitution Prior To Simón y otros
The court in Simón y otros relied upon the supremacy of international treaties ratified by Argentina over domestic law to invalidate
the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws. To better understand how the
Court arrived at its opinion, we will first briefly focus on the status of
international treaties within the Argentinean legal framework.
Prior to the 1994 constitutional reform, Argentina regarded treaties in a manner similar to that adopted by the United States. Treaties
140
were signed by the federal government and were the “supreme law
141
of the land.” Constitutional principles of federalism prohibited the
provinces from engaging in treaty-making with each other or with
142
foreign powers. Arguably, the similarities on this point to the United
States’ system ended there. The Argentinean Constitution established
the structure of international treaties in relation to the powers of government, but the precise status of treaties vis-à-vis the Argentinean
Constitution itself, however, remained a somewhat more obscure issue.
In Ekmekdjian, a 1992 Supreme Court case, it was held that international treaties ratified by the National Congress stood above na143
More specifically, the court noted that human
tional legislation.
139 Notably, most Judges on the Supreme Court carefully avoided this issue in this case.
Justice Petracchi wrote that this law constituted only a mere “formality” or a “declaration.”
Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 34 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opinion. This
sentiment was echoed by Judges Maqueda, Highton de Nolazco, and Lorenzetti. Judge Zaffaroni,
however, spent a considerable portion of his written decision contemplating the Congressional
power to declare its own laws null and void, but strangely enough, failed to reach a conclusion,
stating that “if Congress didn’t have the power to [declare the laws unconstitutional], we undoubtedly would have.” Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 36 of Justice’s Zaffaroni’s vote (author’s translation). All Judges in the majority, except Judges Boggiano and Argibay neither of whom discussed the issue, concurred that the validity of the Law was predicated
upon the co-validation of the Supreme Court. Judge Fayt, however, noted that because the laws
were previously derogated for prospective use by Law No. 24.952, Congress was without the
power to declare something unconstitutional, when it no longer existed in the legal landscape.
Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 10, Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote.
140 See CONST. ARG. art. 27 (1853).
141 See CONST. ARG. art. 31 (1853) (“The Constitution, the laws of the Nation enacted by
Congress in pursuance thereof, and treaties with foreign powers are the supreme law of the
Nation.”).
142 See CONST. ARG. art. 29 (1853).
143 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 07/07/1992, “Ekmekdjian, Miguel Ángel v. Sofovich, Gerardo y otros,” Fallos (1992-315-1492) (Arg.) (hereinafter Ekmekdjian); Compare to the
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rights treaties were of a special character that justified this elevation
144
above domestic laws. It was noted that international treaties were
not only superior domestic law, but also presumptively self-executing
and immediately enforceable if the treaty did not explicitly require
145
additional domestic legislative action.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has progressively chipped away
at this rule, making clear in its holding in Fibraca that superiority over
domestic law did not necessarily entail parity with the National Con146
stitution. This position was affirmed in subsequent Supreme Court
147
decisions. The Court in Hagelin further limited the reach of Ekmekdjian to apply only to situations where the treaty was diametrically opposite to the domestic law and could not be reasonably held to be
148
applicable to the factual circumstances. That court interpreted its
holding in Fibraca to require “the existence of a real conflict between
149
both norms,” rather than a mere overlap of subject-matter. The National Congress overturned these last limitations and expanded upon
the Court’s holding in Ekmekdjian with its dramatic restructuring of
the Federal Constitution.
In 1994, the National Congress held a constitutional reform convention to inject new life into the 140 year-old document, which had
150
received only minor changes since 1860. About half of the Constitution itself underwent revision, and the volume of text approximately
151
doubled. One of the broader parts of the reform is part our key fo-

United States, where the “last in time rule” states that treaties and national legislation are on
equal footing, and it is the one last passed or ratified that rules over the earlier norm. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1), (2)
(1986).
144 See Ekmekdijan, supra note 143. That Court reasoned that human rights treaties were
superior to national legislation principally on three grounds: 1) the complex legislative process
required to ratify a treaty is more stringent than the passing of national legislation, 2) the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties requires treaty obligations to find no impediment in domestic
legislation, and 3) if Congress were endowed with the power of abolishing a treaty by mere
subsequent legislation, it would constitute a violation of the separation of powers. Id.; see also
Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 73 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote.
145 Ekmekdjian, supra note 143.
146 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN] 07/07/1993, “Fibraca onstructora SCA. v. Comisión Técnica Mixta de Salto Grande,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [JA], (1993-IV-471) (Arg.).
147 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN] 12/22/1993, “Hagelin Ragnar v. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional s/ juicio de conocimiento,” Fallos (1993-316-3176) (Arg.).
148 Id.
149 Id. at Considerando No.7 of majority decisión. (author’s translation).
150 Jonathan M. Miller, “Argentina—Introductory Notes: Constitutional History and Political Background,” Preface to CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD —
ARGENTINA Gisbert H. Flanz, Ed. Release 99-6 (Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, NY
1999) vii (hereinafter, all English translations of the Argentinean Constitution derive from this
source).
151 Id. at xii.
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cus—the introduction of Article 75, section 22, which elevates ten international human rights treaties to the status of constitutional obliga152
tion. The list of 10 treaties, however, is by no means exhaustive—the
section provides for all treaty obligations present and future to enjoy a
153
similar hierarchy. The Article provides:
Congress shall have the power to…approve or reject treaties entered with other nations and with international organizations, and concordats with the Holy See. Treaties and
concordats have higher standing than laws.
The following [international instruments], under the conditions under which they are in force, stand on the same level
as the Constitution, [but] do not repeal any article in the
First Part of this Constitution, and must be understood as
complementary of the rights and guarantees recognized
154
herein.
As is evident, the section itself recognizes possible conflicts between treaties and preexisting constitutional doctrine, and underscores the caveat that treaties may not “repeal any article in the First
155
Part of the Constitution.”
In light of its holdings in Fibraca and Hagelin, the Supreme Court
in Simón y otros may arguably not have been empowered to nullify
the amnesty laws without this constitutional reform. In Simón y otros,
the Court was forced to attempt the reconciliation of these laws and
156
157
the American Convention on Human Rights, the ICCPR, the Tor158
ture Convention, and the Geneva Convention on the Law of Trea159
ties. The court found no reconciliation possible, and therefore abolished the laws.

152

ARG. CONST. art. 75, cl. 22 (1994).
Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. This forms the basis for the primary argument in defense of the amnesty laws: abolition of the amnesty laws would be a violation of Article 18 of the Constitution (ex post facto
prohibition) because the use of Article 75, clause 22 to abolish these statutes would be a retroactive application of criminal law. As will be later discussed in greater detail, the majority discards
this defense as inapplicable, but in so doing, discusses the hierarchical standing of treaty obligations within the constitutional spectrum.
156 American Convention, supra note 52.
157 ICCPR, supra note 49.
158 Torture Convention, supra note 51.
159 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
339, was codified by Law 19865, ratified by the Executive Branch on December 5, 1972 and
became effective on January 27, 1980. Law No. 19.865, Oct. 3, 1972, [XXXII-D] A.D.L.A. 6412.
[herein Law of Treaties Convention].
153
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PART III—A LANDMARK CASE
A. Background
The case of Simón y otros originated from a complaint by Buscarita Imperi Roa, who stated that on November 28, 1978, the Armed
Forces kidnapped her son, José Liborio Poblete Roa, her daughter in
law Gertrudis Marta Hlaczik and her granddaughter Claudia Victoria
160
Poblete. The complaint alleged that the retired military officer Ceferino Landa and his wife Mercedes Beatriz Moreira had in their custody Ms. Hlaczik’s granddaughter under the assumed name of Mercedes
161
Beatriz Landa. During pre-trial investigation, it was proven that the
girl was indeed Ms. Hlaczik’s granddaughter and that she had been
162
kidnapped when she was eight months old. As a result, on February
25th, 2000, Landa and Moreira were preventively imprisoned to await
163
trial.
Taking advantage of a criminal procedure provision that allows
164
any private individual to initiate criminal proceedings, the Centro de
Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), an Argentinean human rights
group, amended Mrs. Roa’s complaint to seek punition of Julio “El
Turco Julian” for the torture and extrajudicial killing of Gertrudis
Marta Hlaczik and José Liborio Poblete Roa, calling for the nullification of the amnesty laws.
The complaint alleged that the parents were taken that night to
the governmental detention center “El Olympo,” where officers separated the parents from the girl under the pretense that she would be
165
taken back to her grandmother. The defendant Julio Simón was one
of the various officers that had been involved in the abduction of the
166
family and the subsequent separation of the child form her parents.
Judge Cavallo, sitting on the bench of the Federal Court of Buenos
Aires ordered the detention of Simón and another officer, Juan Anto167
nio Del Cerro, and declared the amnesty laws unconstitutional.
The Federal Court of Appeals of Buenos Aires, echoing Judge Petracchi’s dissent in a 1987 case that validated the Law of Due Ob-

160

Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 1 of Judge’s Petracchi’s majority opi-

nion.
161
162
163
164
165

Id.
Id.
Id.
CÓD. PROC. PEN. art. 146.
Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 2 of Judge’s Petracchi’s majority opi-

nion.
166
167

Id.
Schwartz, supra note 127, at 337-40.
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edience, upheld the trial Judge’s decision to abolish the amnesty laws.
Simón y otros is the resulting appeal from that decision.

168

B. The Court’s Opinion
Eight of the nine Judges sitting on the bench deliberated over the
issues, resulting in a supermajority decision of 7-1 to declare “null and
with no effect” the laws of amnesty shielding military officers from
169
prosecution. As a result, previous Congressional action to declare
the laws null is no longer symbolic in application. The majority declared that “laws 23.492 and 23.521 are with no effect, and no action
premised upon them may impede the judgment against those responsible, or create any obstacle to the investigation of crimes against hu170
manity through appropriate legal avenues.”
The Court held that the Due Obedience and Full Stop Laws were
contradictory to norms of international law adopted by the Constitu171
tion’s Article 75, section 22. Specifically, the laws were held to amnesty human rights violations, an important declaration, the lack of
172
which would render international human rights law inapplicable.
Furthermore, the Court held that in light of Argentina’s obligations as
expressed by the American Declaration of Human Rights, the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights’ rulings, and the ICCPR, upholding the amnesty laws would run afoul of the duties to investigate and
173
punish allegations of human rights violations, to extend judicial protection to victims of crimes against humanity, and to prohibit statutory
174
limitations on human rights crimes. These duties and prohibitions
were held to arise from jus cogens as articulated by the multilateral
treaties to which Argentina is signatory. As a necessary step to apply
these, the court also defined the appropriate stature of treaties within
the Argentinean legal framework, a previously murky subject even
after the constitutional amendment that elevated them to constitutional hierarchy.

168

Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 5 of Judge’s Petracchi’s majority opi-

nion.
169 Judges that voted to nullify amnesty laws: Petracchi, Maqueda, Highton de Nolasco,
Lorenzetti, Boggiano, Argibay, and Zaffaroni. Judge Fayt was the sole dissenting voice. (author’s
translation).
170 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 3 in Judge Petracchi’s majority opinion,
echoed by Judges Boggiano, Maqueda, Zaffaroni, Highton de Nolasco, Lorenzetti, and Argibay.
(author’s translation).
171 Id. at Considerando No. 34 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opinion.
172 Id. at Considerando No. 15 of Judge Argibay’s vote.
173 Id. at Considerando No. 81 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
174 Id. at Considerando No. 40 of Judge Boggiano’s vote.
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It is important to note that the treaties were not treated by the
Court as sources of substantive law. Although the Court perhaps
takes this issue for granted in the opinion, as it is nowhere discussed, it
is nonetheless an important one: The constitutional demands to abolish the Due Obedience and Full Stop Laws are purely procedural.
Indeed, the treaties merely prohibit statutory limitations for these
crimes and impose upon the signatories a duty to investigate and punish such crimes according to domestic criminal law. The substantive
law applicable to those that benefited from the amnesty laws will stem
from the Argentinean Penal Code or from the Military Code of Jus175
tice. Indeed, the amnesty laws are themselves procedural legisla176
tion. The Court in Simón y otros applied jus cogens as articulated by
multilateral treaties signed by the Republic to abolish these procedural restrictions, which resulted in the free application of domestic law
177
to crimes committed by the military during the regime of 1976-1983.
1. Jus Cogens and the duties of the state
Jus cogens is a reference to the status attained by the gravity and
178
An international
the international prohibition of certain crimes.
criminal prohibition reaches the scope of jus cogens when its characte179
ristics submit the action to obligatio erga omnes. This obligation is a
180
denotation of legal imperatives binding upon all nation states.
Commentators have argued that not all violations of internationally
recognized rights attain the status of obligatio erga omnes, but rather
only those that don’t merely establish a right to punish human rights

175 Indeed, the very text of the amnesty laws defines the legislative impediment to prosecution only as the requirement of non-application of domestic law to a particular situation. The
acts themselves never ceased to be crimes, but were declared procedurally nonjusticiable. See
Full Stop Law, supra note 2, at art. 1 (mandating a statute of limitations on prosecutions of alleged violations comprehended under Article 10 of Law 23.049, legislation that conferred military jurisdiction over cases involving violations of the Argentinean Penal Code and Article 108
of the Code of Military Justice); see Law of Due Obedience, supra note 2, at art. 1 (requiring the
exoneration of all but military superiors that committed crimes as defined by Article 10 of Law
23.049).
176 See Full Stop Law, supra note 2; see Law of Due Obedience, supra note 2.
177 See Simón y otros, Lower Court decision, supra note 15 (underscoring that these amnesty laws are prohibitions on the application of the Penal Code to particular acts committed at a
specific time).
178 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of
Fundamental Human Rights: International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes,” 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 63 (1996). Notably, this law review article was cited by Judge Maqueda in his discussion of jus cogens in his vote in the case here studied. Simón y otros, supra
note 3, at Considerando No. 80 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
179 Id. at 63.
180 See id.
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violations, but affirmatively require such action. Thus, jus cogens
denotes a body of laws that are preemptory in nature and thus non182
derogable by domestic laws.
In 1853, when Argentina drafted its Constitution, it outlined in
Article 102 that, “when the crime is committed outside the borders of
the Nation, in violation of international norms, Congress shall deter183
mine by special law the place where the trial is to be held.” This
Constitutional provision has been held by the Supreme Court to introduce jus cogens into Argentina’s domestically enforceable legal
184
framework.
The Argentinean Supreme Court has recognized the existence of
185
the law of nations and its undeniable application to the Republic.
Unlike in the United States, where its Constitution empowers the
Congress only to “define and punish…
offences against the law of na186
tions,” the Argentinean National Congress does not have the power
187
to deviate from established norms of jus cogens. Congress is merely
188
empowered to decide “the place where the trial is to be held.” The
demands of jus cogens to prosecute human rights violators played a
critical role in instructing the Supreme Court’s decision in this case.
Judge Maqueda declares in Simón y otros that Argentina is not
only constitutionally bound to apply jus cogens, but is also bound
189
through its mere membership in the global community. He argues
that Argentina is bound by jus gentium, otherwise known as the law of
190
nations. Thus, jus gentium obligations were adopted and made part
of the Argentinean constitutional mandate before the constitutional
reform in 1994, and even before the 1992 Supreme Court held human
191
rights treaties were of elevated character.

181
182
183

Id. at 65.
Id.
ARG. CONST. art. 102 (1853). Article 102 later became Article 118 in the 1994 Constitu-

tion.
184 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 11/02/1995, “Priebke, Erich s/ solicitud de extradición,” Fallos (1996-318-2148), at 2176 (Arg.) [hereinafter Priebke]; Simón y otros, supra note 3, at
Considerando No. 40 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
185 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 43 of Judge Maqueda’s vote; Corte
Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 3/24/1988 “Sordelli, Beatriz Mabel v. Villalba, Rosina Alcira,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.], (1988-IV-251) (Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 9/25/2001,
“Ceresole, Norberto Rafael v. República de Venezuela s/ daños y perjuicios,” Fallos (2001-3242885) (Arg.).
186 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
187 Priebke, supra note 184, at 2176.
188 See ARG. CONST., art. 102 (1853).
189 See Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Part IV of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
190 Id.
191 Ekmekdjian, supra note 144.
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Citing United States Supreme Court Justice Story’s “Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,” Judge Maqueda notes
that the criminal law of nations that protects individuals at a fundamental level is considered valid amongst all civilized countries once
192
there is a general consensus established by the States. He argues
that the supremacy of the law of nations was a principal concern for
the creation of Article 118 (originally Article 102 in 1853), which
grants the National Congress the power to determine the forum for
193
crimes committed against the law of nations.
Further, the Judge argues that the law of nations has evolved into
a more concrete and discrete body of international norms, encompassed in the notion of jus cogens. He opines that the amnesty statutes deeply offend those erga omnes obligations imposed by jus cogens, and thus are offensive to the National Constitution via Article
194
118.
Some Argentinean jurists contend, however, that Article 118 is little more than a jurisdictional requirement, for although it allows the
National Congress to dictate where trials for delicta iuris gentium
should be held, it by no means elevates crimes against humanity above
195
those domestic crimes amnestiable by national law. Judge Boggiano
notes that Article 118 is much more than just a jurisdictional require196
ment. The Judge had previously noted that the Article contains a
substantive provision prohibiting crimes against the law of nations,
recognizing the severity of the crimes, and that because of their se197
riousness, they hurt all mankind. Thus, he argued, Article 118 incorporated jus cogens into Argentina’s internal positive law.
Even if jus cogens were not so incorporated through the Article,
Judge Maqueda points out that the Inter-American Commission has
defined those erga omnes obligations as “superior order of legal
norms, which the laws of man or nations may not contravene” and as
the “rules which have been accepted, either expressly by treaty or tacitly by custom, as being necessary to protect the public morality rec198
The Judge states that although unequivocally
ognized by them.”
established by Resolution 174 (II) of the United Nations General As192

Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 40 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
Id.; ARG. CONST. art. 102 (1853).
194 See Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 45 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
195 Id. at Considerando No. 64 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote.
196 Id. at Considerando No. 28 of Judge Boggiano’s vote.
197 Id.; Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 04/06/1993, “Nadel, León y otro s/ contrabando,”
Fallos (1993-316-567) (Arg.) (Judge Boggiano dissenting).
198 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 46 of Judge Maqueda’s vote; Roach
and Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9.647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Resolution No. 3/87, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 doc. 9 rev. 1, para. 55 (1987).
193
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sembly in 1947, jus cogens obligations existed well before World War
II, and thus were clearly in force at the time of the enactment of the
199
amnesty statutes.
Furthermore, the Judge notes, jus cogens was one of the more important considerations of the National Congress when reforming the
Constitution in 1994. He quotes a Session Report from the constitutional reform assembly as referring explicitly to the necessity of jus
cogens as an able source of enforceable law because when the State
commits a crime against its own people, history has demonstrated that
200
only international review can remedy the situation.
No Judge, however, argued that the jus cogens principles communicated by the Constitution via Article 118 were sufficient to strike
down the amnesty laws without their articulation by the treaties.
Even the Court's most enthusiastic advocate of the applicability of jus
cogens, Judge Maqueda, concludes that although the erga omnes principles were recognized duties transmitted by Article 118 of the Constitution, they were nonetheless unquestionably binding upon the Argentinean Republic because of treaties such as the American Convention on Human Rights and the decisions by the Inter-American Court
201
of Human Rights. It is therefore unclear whether Article 118 and jus
cogens sans the multilateral treaties or the Constitutional amendment
would have constituted sufficient substance to convince the court to
annul the amnesty laws. It is just as well, perhaps, since the Court concerned itself instead with the present application duties and obligations articulated by treaties such as the ICCPR and the American
Convention on Human Rights.
2. Judicial Protection and Barrios Altos
Through their interpretation of Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court found the Due Obedience and Full Stop statutes to be facially contradictory to Articles 8
202
and 25 of the same Convention. Further, the Court found that these

199

Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 47 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
Id. at Considerando No. 58. The Judge states that Article 75 (22) sought to establish, “a
political constitution, which aims to universalize human rights, recognize those supranational
organisms such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights, as well as recognize those statutes and dispositions to be in harmony
with their resolutions and those of the Executive . . . . National and universal history has proven
that when nation states violate human rights, these can only be reverted by the coactive presence
of international organisms which demand the same. The rights therein consecrated become dead
words when a nation decides not to obey them.” (author’s translation).
201 Id. at Considerando No. 34.
202 Id. at Considerando No. 23 of the majority opinion.
200
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laws were also violative of Article 14.1 and 2 of the ICCPR, as well
204
as Articles 118 of the National Constitution. With the possible exception of this last constitutional Article, these provisions all explicitly
require the same from signatory States: judicial protection and access
to adequate legal remedies for victims of human rights violations.
Article 1.1 of the American Conventions on Human Rights as
well as Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of the ICCPR require those who have been
the victims of some infringement on their human rights to have some
205
effective remedy at law from a competent body. The Court in this
case found the Due Obedience and Full Stop laws to offend this principle, since thousands of claimants were denied an effective remedy at
206
law. This principle, denoted in Argentinean law as the “principle of
equality,” demands that those who have suffered a wrong receive an
207
adequate judicial remedy. In that sense, the principle is not dissimilar from the maxim found in the landmark United States Supreme
203
204
205

Id.
Id. at Considerando No. 28 of Judge Boggiano’s vote.
American Convention, supra note 52, at art. 1.1. The pertinent text of this article reads:

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons
of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.
Id.
The ICCPR article 2.2 reads:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
ICCPR, supra note 49.
Article 2.3 reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in
an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
Id.
206

See Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 23 of Judge Petracchi’s majority

opinion.
207

Id. at Considerando No. 19 of Judge Highton de Nolasco.
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Court case of Marbury v. Madison, which established that there must
208
be a legal remedy for every vested legal right. This maxim is also
made explicit in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on
209
Human Rights.
The majority draws much guidance from the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights’ interpretation of the Convention as ex210
pounded in a recent case, Barrios Altos. Argentina agreed to be subjected to the jurisdiction of this international court and recognized the
competence of that tribunal to interpret the American Convention
208
209

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
American Convention, supra note 52. Article 8 states that:

1.) Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made
against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature. 2.) Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right
to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law.
During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following
minimum guarantees: a.) the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a
translator or interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the language of
the tribunal or court; b.) prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges
against him; c.) adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense; d.) the
right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of
his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel; e). the
inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as the
domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally or engage
his own counsel within the time period established by law; f.) the right of the defense
to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses,
of experts or other persons who may throw light on the facts; g.) the right not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty; and; h.) the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.
Id.
Article 25 of the same Convention, entitled “Right to Judicial Protection” states:
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his
fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or
by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties. 2. The States Parties undertake: a.)
to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by
the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state; b.) to develop
the possibilities of judicial remedy; and c.) to ensure that the competent authorities
shall enforce such remedies when granted.
Id.
210 Simón y otros, supra note 4, at Considerando No. 23 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opinión; Barrios Altos Case (Chumbipuma Aguierre v. Perú)., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Series C, No. 75,
March
14,
2001.
English
copy
of
the
disposition
is
available
at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2007) (hereinafter Barrios Altos).
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when it signed the instrument. Thus, the interpretations of the Convention by the Inter-American Court are held to be highly influential
212
secondary legal authority in Argentinean courts.
In Barrios Altos, the Inter-American Court examined the selfamnesty laws passed by the Peruvian de facto government, which entirely exonerated perpetrators of crimes committed against the Peruvian people in efforts to eradicate “subversion” between 1980 and
213
1995. The Inter-American Court interpreted Articles 1 and 2 of the
Convention to require an adequate remedy at law for victims of human rights violations—a requirement from which no signatory nation
214
could be exempt. That tribunal held that:
In the light of the general obligations set forth in Articles
1(1) and 2 of the American Convention, the States Parties
have the duty to take measures of all kinds to ensure that
no one is deprived of the judicial protection and the exercise of the right to a simple and effective remedy, in the
terms of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. It is for this
reason that the States Parties to the Convention which
adopt laws that have such an effect, as do the laws of selfamnesty, incur in a violation of Articles 8 and 25 in connection with Articles 1(1) and 2, all of the Convention.
The laws of self-amnesty lead to the defenselessness of the
victims and to the perpetuation of impunity, whereby they
are manifestly incompatible with the letter and the spirit of
the American Convention. This type of laws obstructs the
identification of the individuals responsible for violations of
human rights, as obstacles as created to the investigation
and the access to justice, impeding the victims and their relatives to know the truth and to receive the corresponding
215
reparation.
Judge Maqueda reasons that the Barrios Altos case takes on a
special significance in light of Article 75, clause 22 of the Argentinean
216
Constitution, which elevates treaties to constitutional hierarchy.
That significance underscores obligations such as those demanded by
211

Law No. 24658, June 19, 1996, Lexis Nº LNACLY24658 (LexisNexis Argentina).
Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 17 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opinion; Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 8/21/2003, “Videla, Jorge R.,” Fallos (2003-326-2805)
(Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 4/7/1995, “Giroldi, Horacio David y otro s/ recurso de
casación /causa n° 32/93,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [JA] (1995-III-571) (Arg.).
213 Barrios Altos, supra note 210, at ¶¶ 2(i), 2(m).
214 Id. at ¶ 39.
215 Id. at ¶ 43 (author’s translation).
216 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 19 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
212
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Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which prohibit the use of domestic laws as a validation for noncompliance of a treaty.
Furthermore, in its 1992 report on rights conditions in Argentina,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted that the
amnesty laws, along with the presidential pardons, constituted grave
violations of Articles 1, 8 and 25 of the Convention for failing to im219
part judicial protection to victims. Through this guidance, the Court
focused upon an explicit requirement of the decision in Barrios Altos—that nations signatory to the Convention must take positive steps
to remove legal impediments that prohibit the illumination of facts
220
Moreover, the Intersurrounding alleged human rights abuses.
American Court found in Barrios Altos that the “right to truth” is an
inextricable component of a proper interpretation of Articles 8 and 25
221
of the Convention. As such, the plurality in Simón y otros argued,
222
the amnesty laws cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
Consequently, the instructive rule of Barrios Altos used by the
plurality in Simón y otros is that ‘Party States have the duty to take
measures of all kinds to ensure that no one is deprived of the judicial
protection and the exercise of the right to a simple and effective re223
medy.’ The majority therefore adopts the Barrios Altos rule as analogous, since both Peruvian and Argentinean statutes established the
224
same thing: amnesty for violators of human rights.

217 Law of Treaties Convention, supra note 159, at art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).
218 Id. at art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification
for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
219 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, report no. 28/92 (Argentina), October 2,
1992,
at
paragraph
1
of
report
conclusion,
available
at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/28%5E92arg.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
220 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 19 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
221 Barrios Altos, supra note 210, at ¶¶ 47-48.
222 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 20 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opinion.
223 Barrios Altos, supra note 210, at Part X (author’s translation).
224 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 24 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opinion. The Judge states, “It is true that the situation that created the Full Stop and Law of Due
Obediences is not “exactly” the same as that situated in Perú. Nonetheless, when determining
their compatibility with the obligations demanded by international human rights law this is
unimportant. What is dispositive here is that the [Argentinean amnesty laws] present the same
defects which lead the Inter-American Court to renounce the Peruvian “self-amnesty” laws.
They both constitute ad hoc laws whose purpose is to avoid remedy of grave injuries to human
rights” (author’s translation).
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3. Statutes of limitation and human rights crimes
More concretely, jus cogens prohibits all statutory limitations for
human rights crimes, which is an issue of notable importance in this
case. The crime of “forced disappearance” is treated under jus cogens
as a unique crime, where even if a statute of limitations were applicable, its tolling would not commence so long as there still existed any
225
uncertainty regarding the fate of the victim. Argentina integrated
into its positive law the Inter-American Convention on the Forced
226
Disappearance of Persons (Convention on Forced Disappearance),
which defines such crimes as continuous until the fate of the victim is
227
ascertained.
Furthermore, the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons
from Forced Disappearance (Declaration on Forced Disappearance)
also defines this crime as an explicit prohibition by the law of na228
tions. As Judge Boggiano notes in Simón y otros, even if one followed the premise that forced disappearances were susceptible to statutes of limitation, this kind of crime is unique in that the statute
229
would not have begun to toll so long as prosecution was prohibited.
This principle is premised upon the definition of forced disap230
pearances as permanent crimes. Indeed, the Inter-American Court
on Human Rights has held numerous times that the jus cogens crime
of forced disappearance is a crime of a permanent nature, and thus not
231
subject to statutes of limitation. Additionally, the Argentinean Supreme Court has held that crimes of such a character cannot be susceptible to statutes of limitation because the injury occurred not only
before, but continues to this day, and will continue until the facts are
232
brought to light. Moreover, that Court has recognized the prohibi-

225

Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 41 of Judge Boggiano’s vote.
Law No. 24.820, May 26, 1997, Lexis N° LNACLY24820 (LexisNexis Argentina).
227 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, art. III, June 9, 1994,
OEA Doc. AG/RES. 1256 (XXIV-0/94), reprinted in 33 ILM 1529 (1994) [hereinafter Convention on Forced Disappearance]. The pertinent text of the treaty states that forced disappearances
“shall be deemed continuous or permanent as long as the fate or whereabouts of the victim has
not been determined.” Id.
228 Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, GA Res.
47/133, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
229 See Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 41 of Judge Boggiano’s vote.
230 Id.
231 See Trujillo Oroza vs. Bolivia, Series C No. 92, 2/27/2002, para. 72, 2/27.2002, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_92_ing.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2007); See
Velázquez Rodríguez, Series C No. 4, Para. 181, 7/29/1988, available at
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_04_ing.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
232 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], “Arancibia Clavel, Enrique L.,” 8/24/2004, Jurisprudencia Argentina [JA] (2004-IV-426) (Arg.), at Considerando No. 13 of majority opinion. (hereinafter Arancibia Clavel).
226
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tion of statutes of limitation to human rights crimes as inherent in the
law of nations before the induction of the Convention into Argenti233
nean positive law.
As a statutory limitation to the prosecution “permanent crimes,”
therefore, the Full Stop Law facially violates the Convention on
Forced Disappearance and the Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
234
(Statutory Limitations Convention), both of which are now constitu235
tional mandates. These treaties prohibit enactment of domestic law
to limit the time within which a charge for crimes against humanity
236
may be prosecuted.
In regards to the Convention on Forced Disappearance, Article
VII states that:
Criminal prosecution for the forced disappearance of persons and the penalty judicially imposed on its perpetrator
shall not be subject to statutes of limitations.
However, if there should be a norm of a fundamental character preventing application of the stipulation contained in
the previous paragraph, the period of limitation shall be
equal to that which applies to the gravest crime in the do237
mestic laws of the corresponding State Party.
In light of the second paragraph, it may not be said that international law’s prohibition on statutory limitations is clearly absolute.
Pursuant to the Convention on Forced Disappearance, amnesties may

233

Priebke, supra note 184.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, G.A. Res. 2391, 23
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, art. 1(b), U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) [hereinafter Statutory Limitations Convention].
235 The Statutory Limitations Convention was elevated to constitutional hierarchy by Law
No. 24.584, Nov. 1, 1995, Lexis Nº LNACLY24584 (LexisNexis Argentina). The Convention on
Forced Disappearance was also elevated to constitutional hierarchy two years later. Supra note
227.
236 Convention on Forced Disappearance, supra note 227; Statutory Limitations Convention, supra note 234. The Statutory Limitations Convention states in Article 1 that,
234

No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of
their commission: (b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or
in time of peace…eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts resulting
from the policy of apartheid , and the crime of genocide…even if such acts do not
constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.
Id.
237

Convention on Forced Disappearance, supra note 227, at art. VII.
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not contemplate a statutory limitation period less than that corresponding to the gravest crime punishable by domestic laws, provided
there is a pre-existing domestic norm of “fundamental character” requiring that limitation. The Full Stop Law called for the extinction of
all judicial action against persons accused of crimes during the Dirty
238
War within sixty days of its promulgation. The Argentinean Penal
Code defines the permissible periods of statutory limitations for
239
crimes committed. The crimes amnestied by the Full Stop Law cor240
respond to a statutory limitation measured in years, not days. Therefore, even assuming there is a domestic norm of “fundamental character” requiring the limitation, the sixty day period contemplated by the
Full Stop Law violates the jus cogens principle against the statutory
limitations for human rights crimes.
4. Ancillary arguments
In addition to arguments based upon jus cogens and the multilateral treaties to which Argentina is a signatory, the Court employs
several ancillary arguments which further support the annulment of
the amnesty laws, only three of which will be discussed in this comment. Although arguments premised upon notions of sovereignty,
extradition, and the separation of governmental powers formed the
bulk of the lower federal court’s decision, as well as that of the Prosecutor General in this case, they went conspicuously unaddressed by
most Judges. Nonetheless, they are perhaps the soundest arguments
for the annulment of the amnesty laws, and as such, deserve at least
some acknowledgment.
5. Separation of powers
The Court in Simón y otros, invalidates the laws of impunity primarily upon grounds of irreconcilability with international law. Nonetheless, the Court notes that several arguments supporting the aboli-

238
239
240

Full Stop Law, supra note 2, at art. 1.
CÓD. PEN. ARG. art. 62.
Indeed, the statutory limitations provided by Argentinean Penal Code are as follows:

Two years when the crime is punishable only by a fine; One year when the crime is
punishable only by temporary incapacitation; five years when the crime is punishable
only by perpetual incapacitation; the period in time corresponding to the maximum
sentence possibly assessed for crimes punishable by imprisonment or reclusion, not
more than fifteen years, or less than two years; fifteen years when the crime is punishable by perpetual imprisonment or reclusion.
Id.
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tion of the amnesty laws are found within the constitutional require241
ment of a political balance of the governmental powers.
Judge Maqueda argues, as does the majority of Court, that the
Due Obedience law improperly intrudes upon the purview of the
242
judicial branch by establishing an irrefutable presumption of fact.
As previously stated, the statute reads: “It is presumed, and not admitting proof to the contrary, that those who at the time of the commission of the acts…are not punishable for [alleged crimes during military
243
rule] by virtue of having been required to follow orders.” This requirement prohibits Judges to make determinations of fact, which is
244
strictly a faculty of the judicial power. As was established early in
the reported case law of the Republic, the legislative power may not
245
decide “cases” or “controversies.” This is within the exclusive purview of the judicial power. Thus, by denying courts the power to determine whether the individuals that came before them were in fact
“incapable of opposing, resisting, or investigating the orders,” the legislative power impermissibly intruded upon the exclusive province of
246
the judiciary.

241 The lower court in Simón y otros, relied heavily upon one argument based on the separation of powers, which the Prosecutor General discusses at great length, but the majority in this
case conspicuously omits. That argument is based upon Article 29 of the National Constitution,
and its prohibition of state and federal legislatures from extending extraordinary powers to the
Executive branch. It was one of the principal legal proscriptions that moved the lower Federal
Appeals Court to declare the laws unconstitutional. Several other Federal courts subsequently
echoed the lower court in Simón y otros, and struck the amnesty laws down based largely on this
Article. In this case, the argument was presented by the Prosecutor General as requiring the
invalidations of the amnesty laws because the congressional action that enacted them was itself a
violation of the separation of powers required by that article.
Prior to the 1930s, the delegation of “extraordinary powers” to the executive by the legislature was often justified by imminent dangers to the nation. In these cases, it was argued that
certain momentary constitutional sacrifices were warranted when the nation was faced with its
own extinction. The nation created Article 29 thus in response to ensure the domestic uninterruption of democratic institutions. The Prosecutor General argues in his brief that if the
National Congress had in fact assigned the military the “whole of public authority,” or the sum
of political power, then those amnesty laws that sought to immunize the recipients of that power
from criminality are equally offensive to Article 29. Thus, if congressional action conceding the
legislative authority to the military is devoid of legitimacy, then laws that require the abandonment of prosecution of military crimes committed pursuant to that concession are similarly
illegitimate.
242 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando 24 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
243 Law of Due Obedience, supra note 2, at art. 1.
244 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 25 of Judge Maqueda’s vote. The
Judge adopts Judge Bacqué’s dissenting opinion in Camps and “makes it his.” Id.
245 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 6/22/1987, “Camps, Ramón Juan Alberto y otros,”
Fallos (1987-310-1162) (Arg.), at Considerando No. 28 of Judge Petracchi’s dissent. Interestingly,
the Chief Judge relies on the landmark U.S. case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), in
support of this proposition.
246 See Law of Due Obedience, supra note 2 (author’s translation).
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Another separation of powers violation inherent in the Due Ob247
edience law is found in its purely retroactive character. In Argentina, legislative acts must be applicable to future events, and may not
248
declare prior acts legal or illegal. This is the cornerstone of Judges
Petracchi and Bacqué’s dissenting opinions in Camps, a 1987 Supreme
Court case.
In that decision, the Court found that it did not have the power to
rule over the Due Obedience statute because it would implicate a violation of the fundamental balance of power evinced by the structure
249
of the Constitution. It did so, ironically, by employing the converse
reading of the same separation of powers requirement above discussed. The majority wrote in Camps:
The most delicate mission of dispensing justice is knowing
to stay within one’s jurisdiction, without intruding into the
field of the other branches of power. This is especially important when the National Congress exercises its elevated
function of determining the proper coordination between
different interests so that society may survive…It should be
then said that it is not proper for the Judiciary to Judge the
opportunity, merit, or the convenience of the decisions of
250
the other powers of the State.
While it is true that the judiciary may not invalidate a congressional act because it finds fault with its merit or policy, the court in
Camps came very close, admitting they would not declare the statute
unconstitutional only because the threat of another military coup was
a real and manifest danger. This danger, as will be later discussed, is
no longer a looming concern either for the country or the Supreme
Court.
6. Sovereignty and extradition
An underlying constitutional concern for some members of the
Court is the manner in which the amnesty statutes injure the national
sovereignty. There is a principle of the dignity and right of self251
governance that underlies the Argentinean Constitution. As Judge
Zaffaroni states, “the very essence of the Constitution is the attribu247

Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 13 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opi-

nion.
248
249
250

Id.
Camps, infra note 259, at Part I of majority opinion.
Camps, infra note 259, at Considerando No. 11 of majority opinion (author’s transla-

tion).
251

Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 34 of Judge Zaffaroni’s opinion.
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tion or distribution of power in order to exercise the inherent authori252
ty of sovereignty.” This principle is found within the Constitution’s
Preamble, which is not merely a declarative manifestation, but a
253
source of substantive law. Judge Zaffaroni argues that the Preamble’s statement, “[W]e, the representatives of the people…
with the object of constituting the national union, ensuring justice, preserving
domestic peace . . .” is wholly negated when Judges are forced relinquish jurisdiction over complaints that “force Argentineans to be sub254
jected to the courts of any other country on the planet.”
The amnesty laws are unique in that they forbid the prosecution
of crimes which every nation in the world has jurisdiction to try. Thus,
amnesty equals extradition, and extradition for crimes committed by
the Argentinean government against the Argentinean people deeply
255
injures national sovereignty. The amnesty laws therefore reduce the
256
Constitution to a “defective document.” In exercising the national
sovereignty by declaring the amnesty laws unconstitutional, the Court
would effectively be placing a stop on extraditions and allowing those
crimes committed by Argentineans to be tried in Argentina. Judge
Lorenzetti echoes this sentiment, formulating the plurality’s concurrence on this point: “The dignity of the Republic within the international community demands that it clearly reaffirm its will to exercise
257
its jurisdiction and sovereignty.”
C. Defense and Dissent: Principles of Legality and of Equality
Judge Fayt, in his dissenting opinion in Simón y otros, addresses
almost every argument advanced by the majority, coming to entirely
different conclusions. His arguments are mainly premised upon the

252

Id. (author’s translation).
Id. at Considerando No. 35 of Judge Zaffaroni’s opinion.
254 Id. Interestingly, the dissenting and defense arguments take the position that principles
of sovereignty demand a different conclusion. The dissent notes that there is a principle of international law, validated by the United Nations Human Rights Commission as well as the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights, which recognizes the existence of a “margin of national
appreciation.” Id. at Considerando No. 48 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote. This principle guarantees the autonomy of the nation state by reserving to the sovereign a margin of decision-making
legitimacy in the induction of international norms such as jus cogens into the domestic field. This
is in essence an addendum to Judge Fayt’s principle of legality contention. He argues that the
national sovereignty prohibits the sacrifice of the principle, as enabled by Article 18 of the National Constitution, on the altar of international law, because that decision resides within the
“margin of national appreciation.” Id. This begs the question: What falls within this “margin of
appreciation” and what does not? This question is unanswered, and consequently does not form
a great part of the Judge’s dissenting opinion. Id.
255 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 35 of Judge Zaffaroni’s opinion.
256 Id.
257 Id. at Considerando No. 29 of Judge Lorenzetti’s opinion (author’s translation).
253
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Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Camps, i.e., the defense arguments
258
in Simón y otros. Both these are centered around the apparently
irreconcilable conflict between international legal obligations that
demand the retroactive application of criminal law and Article 18 of
the National Constitution, which explicitly prohibits ex post facto
259
laws. Almost every argument advanced by the majority is passed
through Article 18 by the dissent, who concludes that, in light of the
inability of treaties to present conflicts with pre-existing constitutional
principles, all fail constitutional muster.
This “principle of legality” is a fundamental trait of Argentinean
justice, and the conflict is indeed apparent: the treaties which conflict
with the amnesty laws were signed ex post facto the alleged crimes
committed. It is mainly through jus cogens that the majority find their
way around the principle of legality. The defense and dissenting opinion’s arguments fall away, or at the very least, take on a very different form when we accept jus cogens as enforceable domestic law at the
time the crimes were committed.
Although this issue is the backbone of the dissent, it is merely the
majority’s lengthy response to the defense’s main argument. We shall
first examine how the dissent regards the principle as prohibiting the
application of the American Convention, International Covenant on
Social and Political Rights, and other international instruments, and
then determine how the majority overcomes this obstacle.
Article 18 of the Argentinean Constitution states: “No inhabitant
of the Nation may be punished without prior trial based on a law in
260
force prior to the offense.” This principle of nullum crimen, nulla
poena sino lege previa is meant to safeguard those persons whose actions are criminalized at a future time. Even if there should be some
prior prohibition, the principle requires the application of the most
benign law, since the prohibition applies only when the subsequent
261
prohibition is more severe than the earlier. Since the treaties demand the retroactive application of their provisions, these must be
held to be inapplicable to Argentina lest they injure some established
constitutional principle, such as that found within Article 18. Therefore, and taking into consideration that treaties can never injure estab-

258 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 6/22/1987, “Camps, Ramón Juan Alberto y otros,”
Jurisprudencia Argentina [JA] (1987-III-121) (Arg.).
259 CONST. ARG. art. 18 (1994).
260 Id.
261 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 6 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opinion.
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lished constitutional principles, the defense argues, the treaties cannot
262
be retroactively applied.
The defense contends that the majority is retroactively applying
the American Convention, the ICCPR, and the American Convention
263
on Forced Disappearance of Persons. He notes that this is not only
264
clearly a violation of Article 18, but also of Article 27, which requires
the Federal Government to enact only treaties that are “in conformity
with the principles of public law laid down by this Constitution,” as
265
well as Article 75(22), which includes the aforementioned caveat.
We’ll address each in turn.
The ICCPR was signed shortly before the enactment of the amnesty laws, therefore constituting lege previa. Nonetheless, in defense
of the amnesty laws, it is argued that the Argentinean United Nations
delegate present at the treaty debates expressed that the Republic
would only ratify the treaty if it were able to interpret the Article 15.2
of the ICCPR, which commands the retroactive application of jus gentium crimes, as subordinate to the principle of legality commanded by
266
Article 18. Argentina subsequently ratified the treaty in 1986, but
267
issued a reservation to this effect. Thus, the ICCPR, was ratified by
Argentina expressly prohibiting any injury to that specific Article of
268
the Constitution.
This argument contends that in disregarding the reservation
above mentioned, the majority incorrectly and retroactively applied
the American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, which
was signed in 1994. The dissent argues that even if the ICCPR is ap269
plicable, Article VII saves the statutes. As previously discussed, the
ICCPR prohibits statutory limitations, unless there is “a norm of fundamental character preventing the application of [the prohibition of

262

Id.
Id.
264 ARG. CONST. art. 27 (1994).
265 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 9 of Judge Boggiano’s vote (author’s
translation).
266 Id. at Considerando No. 43 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote.
267 Law No. 23313, art. 4., May 13, 1986, Lexis N° LNACLY23313 (LexisNexis Argentina).
The pertinent text reads, “El Gobierno Argentino manifiesta que la aplicación del apartado
segundo del art. 15 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, deberá estar sujeta al
principio establecido en el art. 18 de nuestra Constitución Nacional.”—“The Argentinean Government states that the second section of Article 15 of the Internacional Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights shall comport to the principle established in Article 18 of our Nacional Constitution.” (author’s translation).
268 Id.
269 Convention on Forced Disappearance, supra note 227.
263
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270

statutory limitations.]” In that event, the statutory limitation corresponding to the gravest crime in domestic law applies.
Thus, the statute of limitations determined by the Full Stop Law
is not violative of the treaty for, as the Judge states, “what is Article 18
271
if not a norm of fundamental character?” Interestingly, neither the
dissent nor the defense argues for the application of a statute of limitations according to the “gravest crime in the domestic laws.” This is
possibly because the sixty-day limitation provided by the Full Stop
Law falls very short of the limitation provided for by the Penal Code
272
for any crime punishable by imprisonment.
The majority does not see Article 18 as a major impediment toward the annulment of the amnesty laws. The opinions regarding the
applicability of the principle of legality fall within two camps.
The first is embodied in Judge Petracchi’s argument. He states
(and no other Judge concurs with him on this point) that the ratification of the American Convention and submission to the jurisdiction of
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights necessarily prohibits the
application of the principle of legality in order to disregard human
273
rights obligations. Although Judge Petracchi doesn’t explicitly state
this, it follows logically that in his opinion, the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons overruled Article 18
of the Constitution in matters concerning human rights violations.
The second opinion regarding the applicability of the ex post facto prohibition is embodied in Judge Maqueda and Judge Highton de
Nolasco’s votes, amongst others, that the principle of legality is simply
not implicated in this case. The Judges note that in no way should importance be divested from the inviolable maxim nullum crimen sine
274
lege previa. Judge Maqueda notes that the actions by the military
amnestied by the statutes in question were very much prohibited by
national positive law prior to their commission, and thus there is no
275
retroactive application of law.
Judge Highton de Nolasco notes that jus cogens was an entirely
enforceable source of law during the time of commission of the
276
crimes. Article 118 of the National Constitution acknowledges the
submission of Argentina to supranational norms prohibiting the
270

Id.
Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 38 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote
(author’s translation).
272 CÓD. PEN. ARG. art. 62.
273 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 31 of Judge Petracchi’s majority opinion.
274 Id. at Considerando No. 83 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
275 Id. at Considerando No. 84 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
276 Id. at Considerando No. 31 of Judge Highton de Nolasco’s vote.
271
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277

commission and even the amnesty of human rights crimes. Thus, the
subsequent ratification of treaties that echoed the same was nothing
278
more than an articulation of preexisting positive domestic law.
Judge Boggiano echoes this reasoning, arguing that the annulment of
the laws cannot be prevented by the application of the principle of
legality because jus gentium was an enforceable source of law prior to
279
the commission of the acts.
Further, Judge Maqueda declares, “not only were those crimes
prescribed by international law…
but our own Code anticipates exactly
this sort of conduct and provides its sanction, which indicates that the
280
principle of legality [is not injured].” Specifically, Penal Code Ar281
ticles 141, 142 and 144 prohibited the crime of forced disappearance.
Because the Code provisions predate the commission of the actions
the principle of legality is not violated nor implicated if these persons
282
are tried for crimes committed during the junta.
Another articulation of this view is advanced by Judge Boggiano,
283
who raises a structural argument. Constitutional provisions may not
284
be interpreted to contradict each other. The only way that one could
reconcile Article 118's induction of jus cogens with the principle of
legality in Article 18 is to state that those obligation erga omnes were
applicable to the Republic before the commission of the crimes in
285
question. The Supreme Court has firmly established in prior case
law that “jus cogens has been enforceable law in Argentina from time
286
immemorial.”
Judge Argibay, however, phrases the same concept somewhat differently. She notes that the principle of legality is not implicated nor
violated in two situations: First, the principle cannot be enforced when
the law to be applied does not constitute any change in the legality or
287
illegality of the act previously committed. Indeed, if the action is
illegal when it is committed, it is not cognizable by the principle of
legality. Second, the principle has no place when the legitimate expec288
tations of the actor are not frustrated. In other words, if the actor

277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288

Id.
Id.
Id. at Considerando No. 43 of Judge Boggiano’s vote.
Id. at Considerando No. 84 of Judge Maqueda’s vote (author’s translation).
Id. at Considerando No. 85; CÓD. PEN. art. 141, 142, 143.
See id. at Considerando No. 85 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
Id. at Considerando No. 49 of Judge Boggiano’s vote.
See id.
Id. at Considerando No. 43 of Judge Boggiano’s vote.
Id. (citing his own opinion in the Arancibia Clavel case) (author’s translation).
Id. at Considerando No. 16 of Judge Argibay’s vote.
Id.

226

FIU Law Review

[3:187

could not legitimately expect his conduct to be legal, his expectations
will not be frustrated by the subsequent criminalization of his ac289
tions. Thus, because the kidnapping, torture, and subsequent disappearance of persons could not legitimately be expected to be legal acts
290
at the time of commission, the principle is not implicated in this case.
Additionally, the defense and dissent in Simón y otros, contend
that the Statutory Limitations Convention is inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Convention does not contemplate the crime of forced
disappearance as a crime against humanity. Second, the treaty was
obligatory to the Republic only from 1995, and its retroactive applica291
tion is a violation of the ex post facto prohibition.
It is thus clear that non-applicability of statutes of limitation to
human rights crimes logically intersects with the prohibition on the ex
post facto application of law in this case. Nonetheless, it is possible to
address the above contention in two steps. First, the very nature of the
crime places it among those state actions prohibited by the law of nations, and therefore not susceptible to the prohibition of ex post facto
laws. Second, even if domestic positive law is not subordinated by the
character of the crimes, jus cogens was recognized by the Republic
prior to the commission of the acts, and the principle of legality is not
violated.
Both dissent and defense rest the foundation of their arguments
on a point of law upon which almost every Judge concurs—the inviolability of the principle of legality. Consequently, it is possible their
arguments could have faired better if they had instead challenged the
enforceability of domestic positive law in criminalizing the defendants’ actions at the time they were committed. On this issue, Judge
Fayt merely states that the majority “dogmatically applies” the principles of jus cogens without establishing what are the international
292
practices on the subject, and that it “dogmatically applies” the find293
ings of the Court in Barrios Altos to the Argentinean case. It would
seem that Judge Fayt of the majority’s logic and not its result. Indeed,
the natural continuation of the Judge’s argument on this point would
be to establish that at the time the acts were committed, they were not
prohibited by enforceable domestic law. Perhaps for obvious reasons,
this argument is not made.
The Argentinean Supreme Court could also have drawn guidance, as it has done in the past, from its North American counterpart.
289
290
291
292
293

Id.
See id.
Id. at Considerando No. 39 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote.
Id. at Considerando No. 43 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote (author’s translation).
Id. at Considerando No. 78 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote (author’s translation).
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In the United States, the prohibition on ex post facto laws is also a
294
Both Argentina and the
long-standing principle of criminal law.
United States have determined that this principle prohibits the negative retroactive effect upon a person’s rights. Thus the distinction
could have been drawn by finding that Argentina’s treaty obligations
in this case are of a purely procedural rather than substantive nature.
Retroactive application of purely procedural doctrine which does not
alter the rights of the accused from the moment the act was commit295
ted has never been prohibited in either system. This distinction is
essentially a more clear articulation of the majority opinion in Simón
y otros, that the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege previa rule is not
violated by the retroactive application of Argentina’s current treaty
obligations.
The dissent also addresses the majority's heavy reliance upon the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights's decision in the Barrios Altos case. Judge Fayt argues Barrios Altos is a distinguishable case, and
296
therefore not applicable to the issue at bar. As previously examined,
Barrios Altos considered the Peruvian amnesty laws were not democratically endorsed and exonerated all persons involved in the massacre of several members of the Peruvian communist party Sendero
297
Luminoso. That Court relied upon the American Convention's imposition of the “principle of equality,” or the extension of judicial pro298
tection to every victim of human rights violations, to signatory states.
Judge Fayt's argument is founded on Inter-American Court Judge
299
García Ramírez’s concurring opinion in Barrios Altos. He contends
that because the Peruvian laws were not a product of a democratic
process, they are more like the attempted Argentinean junta’s selfamnesty in the National Pacification Law, and therefore not applica300
ble to the instant case. It is also argued that the Argentinean laws
were not absolute amnesties, and technically, one could still punish
human rights crimes, given of course that charges against a senior military official were filed before the expiration of the Full Stop statute of

294

See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323 (1867).
See id.; see Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/12/1962, “Fiscal v. Santoro, Duilio y
otros / recurso extraordinario,” J.A. (1963-III-481) (Arg.) (noting that a law that violates the
principle of legality is one that creates a new, more prohibitive form of criminal penalty).
The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking for its country, has recognized this principle on several
occasions. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925);
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896).
296 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 78 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote.
297 Barrios Altos, supra note 210.
298 Id.
299 Id. at Paragraph 10 of Judge García Ramírez’s concurring opinion.
300 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 78-79 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote.
295
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301

limitations. In essence, this view distinguishes Barrios Altos because
of its procedural origins and absolutism.
The majority does not respond to this distinction. Nonetheless,
and irrespective of the factual incongruity between the Peruvian and
Argentinean examples, this view does not explain how the principle of
equality as it was applied in Barrios Altos leads to any different result
here. This view seems to suggest an absurd result—that the proper
interpretation of the Convention, which requires signatory states to
“ensure that no one is deprived of judicial protection” instead, means
to “ensure that not everyone is deprived of judicial protection.” Essentially, this reading would establish that the Convention prohibits
only de jure and not de facto denial of judicial protection.
In any regard, the Barrios Altos majority decision was not predicated upon the non-democratic procedural origins of the Peruvian
laws. Although the Barrios Altos court contemplates laws admittedly
classified as “self-amnesties,” the Court does not condemn the laws
because of their non-democratic ratification, but rather because they
demonstrate that Peru “failed to comply with the obligation to adapt
302
internal legislation that is embodied in Article 2 of the Convention.”
Neither was the Barrios Altos decision predicated upon the total
denial of judicial protection. On the contrary, as the Inter-American
Court noted, the Peruvian amnesty laws prevented only criminal
prosecution of the crimes, and allowed unbridled civil liability for the
303
same. From that perspective, the laws condemned in Barrios Altos
were less offensive to the American Convention than those at issue in
Simón y otros in that Peruvian victims were extended judicial protection under civil liability whereas in Argentina, both criminal and civil
304
recourses were extinguished.
PART IV—A TIME RIPE FOR CHANGE
The Prosecutor General writes in Simón y otros that:
[T]he test for the constitutionality of a statute must [have]
correspondence with the moment in history in which the
analysis is made . . . It is not a controversial proposition that
the Constitution should be interpreted dynamically, according to the values of society and the attention that is required

301

See id. at Considerando No. 30 of Judge Fayt’s dissenting vote.
Barrios Altos, supra note 210, at Paragraph 42 of majority opinion.
303 Id. at Paragraph 18 of majority opinion.
304 Law No. 23.984, Sept. 4, 1991, Lexis N° LNACLY23984 (LexisNexis Argentina). Indeed,
under Argentinean law, issues of civil liability usually cannot be disassociated from the criminal
charge, and are part of the same trial. Id.
302
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by those moments in history that change the substance of
305
both evaluative and interpretative paradigms.
Indeed, it may be argued that all of the majority’s arguments in
Simón y otros premised upon the long-standing enforceability of jus
cogens were just as much valid in 1987, when the Court upheld the
306
Law of Due Obedience in Camps, as they are today. Arguments
premised on the separation of powers, upon the violation of jus cogens
as introduced into domestic law through Article 118 of the National
Constitution, injury to national sovereignty, and denial of judicial protection to victims were all valid not only in 1987, but also at the time
the amnesty laws were promulgated and when the crimes were committed. So, what has changed?
The Prosecutor General’s statement is consonant with another
principle of jus cogens echoed by Judge Maqueda: That historically,
governments’ powers to amnesty human rights violations are extinguished when imminent threats to democratic institutions no longer
307
exist. In other words, a government may be justified in amnestying
military actions because the alternative would result in the destruction
of the democratic state. However, once that concern no longer exists,
the government is no longer empowered to maintain that amnesty.
Clearly, the decision in Simón y otros advances a dynamic and fluid
test for constitutionality and compliance with international law. The
political climate of the Republic when the amnesty laws were passed
has dramatically changed, warranting this new change in the Argentinean model from one of amnesty to one of accountability.
Institutionally, Argentina is a different country from its 1980s
counterpart. The threat of military uprising has tremendously dimi308
309
nished. The military no longer wields great political power. Defense spending has steadily declined since Menem commenced a gra-

305

Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Dictámen del Procurador General, VIII-A.
The shift in the legal landscape in this regard focuses on the enactment of Article 75,
clause 22 of the Constitution. The 1994 constitutional reform which added this Article could be
seen as a mere ratification of prior Argentinean jurisprudence, since the Supreme Court had
already held international treaties to be of a higher order than national legislation. See Ekmekdjian, supra note 143. Furthermore, the Court had also previously recognized that the existence of
jus cogens was a long-standing requirement of the Constitution’s Article 118. See Simón y otros,
supra note 3, at Considerando No. 45 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
307 Simón y otros, supra note 3, at Considerando No. 81 of Judge Maqueda’s vote.
308 Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ARGENTINA —
INFORME 2005 65, (Siglo XXI Editores Argentina S.A. 2005) [hereinafter Centro de Estudios
Legales y Sociales]. The Center for Legal and Social Studies notes that, “[The military’s] capacity and intentions of involving themselves in this issue has diminished progressively during the
last few years.” (author’s translation).
309 Brown, supra note 71, at 216.
306
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dual reduction in the flow of funds to the Navy and Armed Forces.
In 1999, an annual report on military expenditures in Argentina was
submitted to the U.S. Congress Committee on Appropriations that
stated, “The Argentinean military does not play a political role. In
contrast to years past during the era of the military juntas, the armed
311
forces no longer pose a threat to the constitutional regime.”
Nine out of ten of the officers currently serving in the armed
312
forces were not in the service during the military regime. Recently,
officers were questioned by the military regarding their most pressing
concerns. Their responses were predominantly regarding low wages
313
and equipment shortages. They did not mention the ongoing arrests
for kidnapped children or the possibility of the annulment of the am314
nesty laws as pressing issues. Many hard right political officials, such
as Carlos Rückauf, ex-Governor of Buenos Aires, which had previously maintained outspoken support for the military and the validity of
the amnesty laws now support the nomination for the Abuelas de la
315
Plaza de Mayo for the Nobel Peace Prize. When the Federal Court of
Appeals handed down its decision, giving rise to the case here examined, the military made clear it was “not going to do anything,” and
316
would specifically avoid “meddling with the courts.” The Federal
310 Id.; Annual Report on Military Expenditures in Argentina, Submitted to the Committee
on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. House of
Representatives
by
the
Department
of
State
on
February
19,
1999,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/99_amiex1.html#ar (last visited 11/30/05). The report
states,

The 2000 budget presented by the Menem government in late 1999 cut the MOD's
budget (excluding pensions) by over 12 percent, to USD 1.8 billion. The new de la
Rua government (which took office in December 1999) accepted most of the Menem budget, including the defense portion, and also called for spending restraints
across the board. For example, in February 2000, the MOD was told to cut spending
by an additional USD 150 million. Given the current tight financial situation in Argentina, we expect that there will be no additional money made available to the
MOD for at least the short-term.
Id.
311 Annual Report on Military Expenditures in Argentina, Submitted to the Committee on
Appropriations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. House of
Representatives
by
the
Department
of
State
on
February
19,
1999,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/99_amiex1.html#ar (last visited 11/30/05).
312 Verbitsky, supra note 112.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 The Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo is an organization founded by the mothers and
grandmothers of disappeared children, who have spearheaded campaigns against the amnesty
laws and continued investigation and prosecution for theft of children during the Dirty War. See
Avery, supra note 33.
316 Id.
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Court of Appeals Judge was subsequently invited to a military ceremony where Military Major General Brinzoni, an official who directly
benefited from the amnesty statutes, assured the Judge that the mili317
tary would obey the orders of the judiciary. In 2001, when the lower
court in Simón y otros struck down the amnesty laws, the Center for
Legal and Social Studies in Argentina (CELS) filed a habeas data to
318
obtain information held by military archives. At that time, 663 officials reported to give testimony, including Major General Brinzoni,
319
and several other high-ranking officials.
Although many political commentators believed that the Supreme Court’s decision here studied would serve no purpose but to
320
“open old wounds” and stir up military frustrations, the CELS reports that of the 199 officials detained after this ruling, only 6 had
321
been in active service during the military regime. Some retired military officials have denounced this ruling but have retaliated only by
publishing newspaper articles and making impassioned public speech322
es. Furthermore, increasingly enabled communication between the
military and civilian communities has fostered an ongoing dialogue
regarding the needs of national defense departments, as is evidenced
by several public forum debates, such as the “Values and Principles of
the Military Profession Conference,” and the “Conference on Nation323
al Defense and International Dimensions of Security.” This has also
greatly contributed toward decreased tensions within both the mili324
tary and between the armed forces and the civilian government.
The lower court’s declaration in 2001 revived popular fervor for
illuminating the events of Argentina’s troubled past. In 2004, the government sanctioned a project to memorialize persons disappeared
during the military regime, and make public the location of clandes325
tine military installations where interrogations took place. International attention has been well received by the Argentinean govern317 Id.; General Brinzoni now possibly faces prosecution as he was the Secretary General of
the Chaco Province in December 1976, where seventeen political prisoners were killed. “Argentina: Supreme Court Should Resist Army Pressure,” Human Rights Watch
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/12/argent5394.htm (last visited 11/30/05); Verbitsky, supra
note 112.
318 Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, supra note 308, at 65.
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ment, which held conferences on the reaffirmation of human rights in
the country, inviting Kerry Kennedy from Amnesty International, the
director of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., Sara Bloomfield, and the Chief Executive of Human Rights First, Michael Posner,
326
among others.
Although the 2001 decision was initially viewed with some skepticism, several courts have echoed Judge Cavallo’s pronouncement. In
September 2003, the Federal Capital’s Court of Appeals opened the
ESMA case for re-hearing, which had previously prohibited the prosecution of several military officers involved in human rights violations
327
in the Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA). The Camps case,
which originally validated the Law of Due Obedience has also been
ordered reopened, and the Chief of Police of the Buenos Aires prov328
ince as well as his subordinates prosecuted. Several other federal
courts in other provinces have followed suit, declaring the amnesty
laws unconstitutional, and prosecuting previously immune participants
329
of the Dirty War.
The trend of the Argentinean political landscape seems to echo
Judge Lorenzetti’s words in Simón y otros, “[There] are certain acts
330
that simply cannot be forgotten.” Indeed, the demand for prosecution of crimes against the Argentinean people during its last military
regime seems to have only risen. In 2003, two months after being
sworn into office, President Kirchner signed a decree authorizing the
extradition of forty-three officials to Spain, who were alleged to have
331
taken part in crimes against humanity during the Dirty War. Spain
subsequently declined to seek extradition in anticipation of the Su332
President Kirchner stated
preme Court’s Simón y otros decision.
333
that he wished all those accused to be tried in Argentinean courts.
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Clearly, the political climate has changed so dramatically, that those
fears transparent in Camps are no longer manifest today.
CONCLUSION
The Argentinean Supreme Court has handed down a landmark
decision in Simón y otros, declaring amnesty laws of Due Obedience
and Full Stop repugnant to the Constitution. With the aid of the 1994
constitutional reform, which elevated treaties to which Argentina was
a signatory to constitutional hierarchy, the Court was unable to deny
the blatant contradiction between the amnesty laws and Argentina’s
obligations to international law.
The implications of this judgment are broad. The Court has
opened the door to the immediate prosecution of over 1,200 officers
334
thought to be currently immune from prosecution. After more than
11 years of legislative efforts to bring Argentina within compliance of
international human rights obligations, the judiciary's efforts have met
with resounding approval. Argentina currently recognizes the duty to
prevent, investigate, and punish human rights abuses as commanded
by the American Convention on Human Rights, and more specifically,
335
the applicability of these obligations to the events of 1976 to 1983.
Annulment of the laws may constitute a positive step toward restoring
the Argentinean people’s confidence in the democratic process, an
effect that is in itself, a remarkable achievement.
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